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Snipings
The rubric ‘Snipings ’, introduced into the World Trade Review in 2004, is
intended for contributions which, while rigorous, are shorter and therefore less
extensively developed and documented than our standard length articles. It offers,
among other things, an opportunity for early analyses targeting topical policy
issues concerning the multilateral trading system.
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Abstract : Export restrictions imposed on various food products and natural
resources have been subject to extensive public attention. Most recently, China’s
restrictions of its exports of certain minerals and rare earth metals have led to
heated debates. The United States (US), European Union (EU), and Mexico have
already filed a WTO dispute case against China on this matter. This paper
describes the policy objectives and the global welfare implications of export
restrictions. It summarizes the relevant WTO regulation, and offers a detailed
analysis of the China–Raw Materials case which is before the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). It argues that although export restrictions is arguably an area of
‘under-regulation’ or ‘regulatory deficiency’ in the WTO law, it is strongly
biased against the late accession Members, including China. Yet, the way that
China institutes its export restrictions raises serious questions about its role in the
multilateral trading system, which it relies on for its economic prosperity. Hence,
this is an area where China is likely to feel the implications of its so-called
‘WTO-plus’ commitments on its domestic and trade policies.
1. Introduction
China has recently been under the spotlight regarding its export restriction poli-
cies. In December 2009, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade
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Organization (WTO) established a panel to examine complaints by the United
States (US), the European Union (EU), and Mexico concerning China’s export
restrictions on selected minerals (China–Raw Materials case).1 The commodities
in question were bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, phosphate
(yellow phosphorus), silicon (metal and carbide), and zinc. More recently, in
November 2010, China was alleged to be restricting its exports, this time, of rare
earth metals, in which it is almost a monopoly supplier, to Japan and to other
industrialized countries which attracted substantial international media attention.2
China’s export restriction policies raise serious questions about its role in the
multilateral trading system in general and the implications of its so-called ‘WTO-
plus’ commitments for its domestic and trade policies in particular.3
What are the policy objectives of China in instituting export restrictions? Is the
policy simply a reaction to certain non-trade political disputes with Japan and
the US creating trade-related tensions? Alternatively, is it a reflection of China’s
assertiveness in the growing global competition over natural resources? Similarly,
could its concerns over domestic environmental protection and sustainable use of
exhaustible resources play an important role as a policy objective? Given that
China is major producer, consumer and trader of many commodities that are
strategically important for global supply chains, its export restrictions may have
substantial consequences for global welfare.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a range of policy objec-
tives that might lead countries to institute these measures and it illustrates their
potential implications for global welfare. Section 3 summarizes the WTO regu-
lation dealing with the issue and briefly reviews the previous GATT and WTO
disputes involving export restrictions. Section 4 offers a detailed analysis of
the China–Raw Materials case which illustrates how China imposes quantitative
restrictions and export taxes. This section attempts to clarify the extent to which
these measures might be related to environmental protection, or be used as a dis-
guised restriction on trade. Section 5 examines the potential implications of
China’s ‘WTO-plus’ commitments in this field. Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.
2. Export restrictions and their welfare implications
Both developing and developed countries resort to export restrictions which
can take the form of export taxes, quantitative restrictions (through quotas and
licences), and outright export bans. As a form of market distortion, these restric-
tions change the terms of trade and shift economic rents. As compared to other
policy alternatives, such as direct support/subsidies or income taxes, it is often
1 WTO (2010a).
2 See Bradsher (2010), Hook and Dickie (2010), Leggett (2010).
3 WTO-plus commitments are defined as the Protocol commitments – which new entrants to theWTO
are often required to undertake – that are more stringent than those of original WTO Members.
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argued that export restrictions are not the most effective policy tools to achieve
distributional objectives (WTO, 2010b). On the other hand, some countries
impose them to address market failures, especially in the field of environmental
protection (Korinek and Kim, 2009).
In the agricultural sector, export restrictions are applied to maintain domestic
food supplies and achieve food security, especially in the face of the risks of tight
supply conditions in relatively ‘thin’ international markets.4 In the industrial
sectors, export restrictions often serve the objective of promoting downstream
processors and manufacturers. By restricting the exports of certain raw materials,
a country can lower input prices for downstream sectors, which in turn gives it a
price advantage in export markets for processed and manufactured goods.
However, export restrictions result in net welfare losses for both the country
imposing the export restriction and for the rest of the world by driving a wedge
between the domestic and border prices. The potential impacts vary depending on
the demand and supply elasticities of the commodity, the specific measure in
question and on who appropriates the rent (difference between the domestic and
border prices). In the country imposing export restrictions, the consumers of the
restricted product would benefit from lower than pre-export restriction prices.
However, the aggregate loss of producer welfare would exceed consumers’ gains
from the measure (i.e. deadweight cost of market distortion). It may also lead to
various inefficiencies in allocation of resources as it may promote sectors which do
not have comparative advantage.
Export restrictions also undermine traders’ confidence in the world trading
system – as they distort trade and create or aggravate short-term price volatilities
(von Braun, 2008; WTO, 2010b). The restriction measures that seek to insulate
domestic prices from changes in world market prices (e.g. in the agricultural
sector), or to gain strategic advantages by limiting the supply of critical raw
materials have a destabilizing effect on world prices, which in turn offsets the
benefits that countries seek to gain from these measures.
Countries may also impose export restrictions for environmental reasons. Since
markets for environmental goods and services are not fully developed, if they exist
at all, market prices do not reflect the social value of environmental goods, such
as fisheries, forestry, minerals, and fresh water.5 Mining is a case in point – as by-
products of extracts and various inputs used in mining operations could be highly
contaminating.6 Hence in a highly export-oriented sector, export restrictions, in
4 Global agricultural markets are ‘thin’ in the sense that only a small share of global farm production
is traded internationally, which increases the risk of price instability in cases of disruption in supplies. See
Anderson (2010).
5 Water in the form of ‘virtual water’ – total amount of water used in production of a commodity –
could also be seen as exhaustible if it is traded. See Hoekstra (2010).
6 For instance, mining sites in China, India, Peru, Russia, and Zambia have been identified as some of
the world’s most environmentally polluted areas – as contamination of the air, water, and soil in these
areas substantially exceeds the safety limits. See Blacksmith Institute (2007).
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conjunction with other domestic measures limiting production and consumption,
could help correct market failures that lead to environmental degradation and
unsustainable resource depletion. Nevertheless, depending on the objective and the
nature of the environmental externality to be targeted, various policy tools could
be employed to restrict production rather than trade, which could be equally or
more effective than export restrictions and potentially less.7 However, low-income
countries often have better capacity to control trade than to control domestic
production and consumption, and the introduction or increase of production
taxes instead of export taxes may encourage firms to evade production taxes by
relocating to the informal sector (Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). Hence in those
countries, administering export restrictions is a second best, yet more feasible,
policy option to target environmental externalities.
3. WTO regulation on export restrictions
The WTO regulation dealing with export restrictions is relatively limited, offering
ample ‘policy space’ for domestic policy considerations. The most relevant legal
texts in this context are GATT XI and Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA). GATT XI requires Members to eliminate all prohibitions and quantitative
restrictions on exports. As for export restrictions aimed at environmental protec-
tion, violating GATT XI can be excused if restrictions qualify for an exception
under Article XX. Article 12 of the AoA mirrors GATT XI, yet also requires
Members to give written notice to the Committee on Agriculture, and to consult
with Members who are likely to be affected by their export restrictions. GATT XI
does not restrict Members to imposing export taxes (Crosby, 2008), but if they
are applied at levels which are de facto prohibitive, they might be considered as
measures amounting to export bans, which would violate Article XI.
On the other hand, some new WTO Members, such as China, Mongolia,
Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine, were required, during their accession negotiations, to
commit themselves to stricter rules, so called ‘WTO-plus’, which restrict their
‘policy space’ in this field. Although the scope and the scale of their commitment
varied, they were obliged to phase out export taxes or to limit them to a designated
number of tariff lines with a bound rate (Crosby, 2008). Hence it may be argued
that the WTO law in relation to export restrictions is biased against the late
accession Members, including China.
The DSB’s interpretation of export restrictions
Few cases relating to export restrictions have been brought before the WTO/
GATTDispute Settlement Body. In all cases, the disputes involved accusations that
the export restrictions had been designed to offer some form of advantage to the
7 See Balistreri and Worley (2009) for an example of how alternative policies to exports restrictions
could result in lower welfare losses in the case of those imposed on mercury for environmental reasons.
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downstream producers and processors of the country instituting the measure, at the
expense of the downstream sectors in complainant countries.8 Only in one resolved
case, Canada–Salmon, did the defendant resort to the environmental exceptions
under GATT XX (see below).
The case of Canada–Salmon is highly relevant in the context of the China–Raw
Materials examined below. In this case, the disputed regulation was part of
Canada’s fishery legislation stating that ‘No person shall export from Canada any
sockeye or pink salmon unless it is canned, salted, smoked, dried, pickled or fro-
zen. ’ The complainant, the US, claimed that this was a clear violation of Article XI.
It alleged that the disguised objective of the measure in question was to promote
the downstream processor sectors in Canada, at the expense of the processors
in neighbouring areas in the US territory.9 However, Canada claimed that the
measures under dispute were part of its fisheries conservation and management
regime and hence justified under Article XX(g), which allows for restrictive
measures if they are ‘relating to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
In this case, the Panel examined whether these measures could be justified by
Article XX(g). It first assessed the meaning of the terms ‘relating to’ and ‘in con-
junction with’ as stated in Article XX(g). Its interpretation was that for a trade
measure to be considered as ‘relating to’, it had to be primarily aimed at conser-
vation of exhaustible resources. It also stated that a trade measure could only be
considered to be ‘in conjunction with’ production or consumption restrictions if
‘ it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions’.10
Then the Panel examined whether the Canadian regulation could satisfy these
criteria. It found that, affirming the US argument, the Canadian fishery regulation
which restricted domestic production (i.e. harvesting) covered other fish varieties
which were not subject to export prohibitions. In addition, the export prohibitions
only applied to supplies in unprocessed form and did not cover exports of the same
varieties in general. The Panel also found that these measures restricted purchases
of these commodities only by foreign processors and consumers and not those
made by domestic processors and consumers. Hence it concluded that ‘these
prohibitions could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at the conservation of
salmon and herring stocks and at rendering effective the restrictions on the
harvesting of these fish’. So it determined that the export prohibitions imposed by
Canada violated Article XI and could not be justified under Article XX(g).11
The two other major disputes concerning export restrictions were the Japan–
Semiconductors12 and the Argentina–Hides and Leather cases.13 The Japan–
Semiconductors case involved a component dealing with ‘export restrictions’
8 For example, see GATT (1988a); WTO (2001a).
9 GATT (1988b), para. 3.11.
10 GATT (1988b), para. 4.6.
11 GATT (1988b), para. 4.7.
12 See GATT (1988a).
13 See GATT (1988b).
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allegedly imposed by Japan. The Panel in this case concluded that Japan
exerted various forms of pressure on the private sector to eliminate the sale
of selected semi-conductors below company-specific prices, which substantially
restricted their exports, hence violating Article XI.14 The Argentina–Hides and
Leather dispute investigated the EC’s complaint about measures taken by
Argentina on the export of bovine hides.15 The EC alleged that Argentina had
imposed a de facto export prohibition on raw and semi-tanned bovine hides which
allegedly violated GATT Article XI:1.16 However, the Panel concluded that the EC
had not offered satisfactory evidence to illustrate how the Argentinean regulation
in question would violate Article XI.17
4. China–Raw Materials case
In December 2009, the Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to examine
complaints by the US, the EU, and Mexico concerning China’s export restrictions
on selected minerals. The commodities in question were bauxite, coke, fluorspar,
magnesium, manganese, phosphate (yellow phosphorus), silicon (metal and
carbide), and zinc. The complainants alleged that China’s policies regarding the
exportation of these commodities are inconsistent with its obligations under
Article VIII, Article X, and Article XI of the GATT 1994 and the Protocol on the
Accession of the People’s Republic of China (‘Accession Protocol’) (WTO
Secretariat, 2001b) and the Working Party Report on the Accession of China
(WTO, 2001c).
The complainants’ case rests upon three pillars (WTO, 2009a) : (a) China
imposes quantitative restrictions on the commodities in question; (b) it imposes
export duties on them; (c) it resorts to other constraints on the exportation of
these commodities, through fees and excessive formalities which are applied ‘ in a
manner that is not uniform, impartial, and reasonable’. The following section
looks at the first two components of the case. The third component, which is
related to China’s administrative measures, albeit relevant, goes beyond the scope
of this paper.18
Domestic production and trade
China is a major producer and exporter of the majority of these commodities
which are often strategically important for a range of manufacturing sectors
(see Table 1 for a range of applications). As shown in Table 1, between 2002,
14 GATT (1988a), para. 117.
15 WTO (2001a).
16 In this case, the EC also alleged that Argentina had violated GATT Article III by imposing an
‘additional value added tax’ and an ‘advance turnover tax’ on the price of imported finished leather.
17 WTO (2001a), para. 11.55.
18 As of March 2011, the decision of the Panel regarding this case had not been published. Therefore
the analysis undertaken in this section is based on the existing jurisprudence and the data that are pub-
lically available, and hence may not necessarily reflect the actual proceedings of the Panel’s investigation.
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Table 1. Industrial applications, production trends and share in world production of selected minerals in China
Applications
2002
(000 tons)
2008
(000 tons)
2002–2008
growth (%)
Share in world
production (%)
Bauxite Main source of aluminium, which is widely used in packaging,
transportation, building, electrical and consumer durables
12,000 32,000 167 31
Fluorspar Used in production of hydrofluoric acid, which is used in the
electroplating, stainless steel, refrigerant, and plastics industries.
2,450 3,200 31 55
Magnesium
Compounds
Used in refractories and in agricultural, chemical, construction,
environmental, and industrial applications
1,070 2,000 87 45
Magnesium
Metal
A constituent of aluminium-based alloys that are used for
packaging, transportation, and other applications
230 700 204 87
Manganese Used in steel production, pig iron manufacture and in upgrading
ore to ferroalloys. Also used in dry cell batteries, plant fertilizers
and animal feed
900 2,800 211 21
Phosphate Mined to manufacture phosphoric acid and superphosphoric acid,
used in fertilizers, animal feed supplements, food additives and
industrial applications
23,000 50,000 117 30
Silicon Used by producers of aluminium and aluminium alloys, the
chemical industry, and the semiconductor industry
1,500 3,300 120 58
Zinc Used in galvanising, in zinc-based alloys, and in brass and bronze.
Zinc compounds and dust are used by the agriculture, chemical,
paint, and rubber industries
1,550 3,200 106 28
Source : Compiled by the author based on USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (2010).
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when China joined the WTO, and 2008, the volume of production of all of these
minerals has grown substantially (USGS, 2010). In 2008, China’s share in world
production of the minerals listed above was reported to range between 28% for
zinc and 87% for magnesium metal. As such, China is a major, and in some cases
the biggest, producer of these commodities.19
The picture for trade flows and volumes, however, is different. For some mi-
nerals, China is a major exporter, and for others, it has become a major importer,
despite also being a major producer. The volume of its exports has fluctuated over
the past few years. Between 2002 and 2008, the export volumes of silicon and
magnesium increased considerably. The biggest rise was in silicon exports which
grew by 90%. As of 2008, among the listed minerals, the highest market shares
held by China were for silicon and magnesium, each amounting to about 45% of
total world exports. It is clear that China controls a substantial share of world
markets in these commodities (see Table 2) (UnComtrade, 2010). By contrast, the
exports of some other minerals have declined considerably. The biggest drops
were seen in exports of bauxite and zinc (82% each). China has become a major
Table 2. Volume of exports (thousand metric tons) in selected minerals in China,
2002–2008
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Share in world exports (%)
2002 2008
Bauxite 635 1,048 1,410 1,144 840 164 112 2.1 0.2
Fluorspar 200 115 93 70 59 53 84 11.4 8.2
Magnesium 2,452 2,543 2,567 2,389 2,671 2,916 3,091 40.4 43.5
Manganese 777 887 1,261 842 1,096 1,366 1,277 2.2 6.7
Phosphate 3,697 3,716 3,236 2,216 1,034 1,062 2,069 16.0 6.2
Silicon 1,160 1,574 1,710 1,676 2,183 2,491 2,212 28.0 45.2
Zinc 590 583 331 209 1,085 332 104 4.4 0.7
Coke 13,58 14,75 15,07 12,88 14,54 15,33 12,29 43.9 33.6
Source : UnComtrade (2010), compiled by the author based on the following HS codes:
Bauxite: 260600, 262040, 760110, 760200
Fluorspar: 252921, 252922
Magnesium: 810411, 810419, 810420, 251910, 251990, 253020, 281610, 282731, 283321
Manganese: 260200, 811100, 282010, 720211, 720230
Phosphate: 251010, 251020, 280470
Silicon: 280461, 280469, 284920, 720221, 720229
Zinc: 260800, 262011, 262019, 281700, 790111, 790112, 790120, 790200
Coke: 270400
19 Due to data source incompatibility, the table excludes coke, which is not a mineral. It is a solid
carbonaceous residue derived from low-ash, low-sulfur bituminous coal. It is reported that China’s coke
output amounted to 327 million tons in 2008, constituting a share of over 60% of the world’s total
production. See China International Coking Technology and Coke Market Congress (the 8th).
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importer of these minerals. For example, between 2002 and 2008, the volume of
its bauxite imports grew by approximately 2,400%, from 1.1 million metric tons
to more than 28 million metric tons (UnComtrade, 2010).
Export restrictions
The imposition of export restrictions on a range of commodities has long been part
of China’s trade policy. The list of items subjected to various forms of export
restrictions goes beyond the minerals listed in the China–Raw Materials case. A
number of agricultural products (timber, cattle, chemical fertilizers), and other
minerals, such as molybdenum, chromium, and rare earth metals are commodity
groups which have been subject to export restrictions. For clarity of the analysis,
however, the section below focuses on the minerals mentioned in the case.
Quantitative restrictions on exports
The first component of the case against China challenges the WTO compatibility
of these quantitative restrictions. Based on the official announcements of China’s
Ministry of Commerce, five of the commodity groups listed under industrial
products are mentioned in the case – namely bauxite, fluor, silicon carbide, mag-
nesium, and phosphorite (see Table 3) – are subject to export quotas in 2009 and
2010 (Ministry of Commerce, 2008). However, it is important to note that some
of these export quotas, for instance for bauxite, are not fully utilized by exporters.
It is clear that, unless justified by exceptions, the mere existence of these mea-
sures is inconsistent with GATT XI:1. Moreover, Paragraph 162 of the Working
Party Report refers to export restrictions and provides that ‘China would abide by
WTO rules in respect of non-automatic export licensing and export
restrictions _Moreover, export restrictions and licensing would only be applied,
after the date of accession, in those cases where this was justified by GATT pro-
visions. ’ As such, before going into an analysis of the possibility of exceptional
Table 3. Total export quota (thousand metric
tons) for selected industrial products in China,
2009–2010
Commodity Name
Quota Amount
2009 2010
Bauxite 930 930
Fluor 550 550
Carborundum (Silicon carbide) 216 216
Light (heavy) calcined magnesite
(Magnesium carbonate)
1,400 1,330
Phosphorite 1,500
Source : Ministry of Commerce (2008).
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conditions which may allow these measures, it is clear that China’s quantitative
export restrictions violate its commitments under GATT XI and the Accession
Protocol.
Export taxes
The second component of the case is about export taxes. China resorts to export
taxes quite extensively. According to the ‘Circular of the Customs Tariff
Commission of the State Council on the Tariff Execution Plan 2010’, a total of
329 tariff lines (8-digit Harmonized System (HS)) are subject to export taxes,
which are applied in the form of ‘export tariffs’, and/or ‘ interim tariffs’ and/or
‘special export tariffs’. All of the minerals mentioned in this case are listed in the
Tariff Execution Plan 2010 (ETCN, 2010). Ranging from 5% for magnesium
oxide to 40% for coke, various degrees of export taxes are imposed (see Table 4).
In relation to the WTO compatibility of its export taxes, which is under dispute,
China faces significant constraints arising from its accession commitments rather
than its obligations under GATT, which allows Members to impose export taxes.
Its Accession Protocol explicitly limits the number of items and the level of export
taxes that China is allowed to impose. According to Article 11.3 of the Accession
Protocol, ‘China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless
specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with
the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994’ (WTO, 2001b). Accordingly,
Annex 6 lists a total of 84 tariff lines (8-digit HS), with maximum levels of export
duties. China also confirmed that it would maintain the applied rates imposed at
the time of the agreement and would consult with its trade partners who would
potentially be affected if, under ‘exceptional circumstances’, it had to increase its
applied rates (still not to exceed the maximum level indicated in Annex 6).20
In order to establish whether China complies with its commitments under
the Accession Protocol, the question is whether China imposes export duties
on commodities which are not listed in Annex 6, and whether it exceeds the
maximum levels designated in Annex 6. As indicated in Table 4, China imposes
export taxes on a number of minerals that are not listed in Annex 6 (for example,
nine forms of magnesium, two forms of fluorspar, and coke).21 Also, the export
taxes on some of the minerals that are listed in Annex 6 exceed the maximum rates
indicated (for example, ‘unwrought aluminum alloy’). It should also be noted that
China revises its export taxes quite often, apparently following trends in prices and
the demand and supply situation related to the commodity in question (China
Chemical Reporter, 2009).
20 See WTO (2001b), Annex 6, at 95.
21 China also imposes export taxes on some sub-products of minerals, which are listed in Annex 6. For
instance, although ‘not alloyed, unwrought Zinc (<99.99% pure)’ and ‘Zinc ores and concentrates’ are
allowed to be subject to export taxes, China imposes taxes on ‘Zinc waste or scrap’ and ‘Ash or residues
containing hard zinc spelter’, which are not listed in Annex 6.
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Table 4. Export taxes imposed on selected minerals by China, 2010
Product form
Export
tariff
Interim
tariff
WTO
accession
annex 6
Bauxite Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed, >99.95% pure 30% 0%
Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed, <99.95% pure 30% 15%
Unwrought aluminium alloy 30% 15% 30%
Waste or scrap, aluminium 30% 15% 30%
Fluorspar Fluorspar, >97% calcium fluoride 15%
Fluorspar, <97% calcium fluoride 15%
Magnesium Magnesium unwrought >99.8% pure 10%
Magnesium unwrought 10%
Magnesium waste or scrap 10%
Fused magnesia 10%
Dead-burned magnesia 10%
Light-burned magnesia 5%
Natural magnesium carbonate (magnesite) 5%
Magnesium oxide 5%
Other mineral products with 70% or more magnesia 5%
Manganese Manganese ores, concentrates, iron ores >20%
manganese
15%
20%
Manganese, articles thereof, waste or scrap 20% 20%
Ferro-manganese, >2% carbon 20% 20%
Ferro-silico-manganese
Phosphate Natural calcium phosphates, unground 35%
Natural calcium phosphates, ground 35%
Yellow phosphorus 20% 20%
Other phosphorus 20% 10% 20%
Silicon Silicon, <99.99% pure 15%
Ferro-silicon, >55% silicon 25% 25%
Ferro-silicon, <55% silicon 25% 25%
Zinc Zinc, not alloyed, unwrought, >99.995% pure 20% 0%
Zinc, not alloyed, unwrought, >99.99% pure,
<99.995% pure
20%
20%
5%
15%
20%
Zinc, not alloyed, unwrought, <99.99% pure 10%
Zinc waste or scrap 30% 30%
Zinc ores and concentrates 10%
Ash or residues containing hard zinc spelter 10%
Ash or residues containing mainly zinc (not spelter)
Coke Coke, semi-coke of coal, lignite, peat & retort carbon 40%
Notes : Export tariffs are the generally applicable rates; ‘ interim’ tariffs are applied for a defined period
of time (e.g. high season), and generally valid for one year. The Government reviews interim tariffs and
adjusts them as it deems necessary. It can also set ‘special’ tariffs in response to special circumstances.
According to the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export Duties (Article
11) ‘In cases where export goods, to which export tariff rates are applicable are subject to temporary
tariff rate, the temporary tariff rate shall apply.’
Source : Compiled by the author based on ETCN (2010), and China Accession Protocol.
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The fact that China’s ‘Tariff Commission of the State Council on the Tariff
Execution Plan 2010’, includes 329 items while Annex 6 of its Accession Protocol
includes only 84 items (both 8-digit HS), illustrates that the coverage of China’s
export taxes goes beyond the list of commodities designated in Annex 6, and they
often exceed the levels to which China committed itself with its Accession
Protocol.22
Favouring downstream sectors?
The impact of these measures on domestic prices is particularly apparent
when considering those minerals of which China is a major exporter. For instance,
the domestic prices of minerals such as ferro-silicon, silicon metal, and ferro-
manganese, of which China is one the world’s biggest producers and exporters,
have been consistently lower than the international prices. As is shown in Figure 1,
between February 2007 and February 2010, domestic prices of ferro silicon
(75% pure) were significantly lower than those in the Western markets, namely
Figure 1. Ferro-silicon prices, China, Europe, US, 2007–2010
Source : Metal Bulleting Research (2010).
22 China also uses differing rates for value-added tax (VAT) rebates for exports. The amount of refund
that exporters are entailed to receive depends on the VAT refund rate specified for different categories of
exports. Hence it may range from 0% to 17% and is subject government reviews (Global Tax Watch,
2010). Commodities such as steel and nonferrous metal products are subject to lower levels of VAT
refund, mainly because of the Government’s policies that aim to promote domestic industries. It may be
argued that these measures amount to export restrictions. However the complainants of the China–Raw
Materials case did not refer to them when making their case against China’s export restrictions.
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Europe and the US (Metal Bulleting Research, 2010). Similar price differentials
between domestic and international prices exist in other minerals, such as silicon
metal and ferro manganese. Such price differentials, which might be partly a result
of export restrictions, clearly offer significant price advantages to the domestic
downstream manufacturing sectors over foreign producers, which is one of the
main concerns of the countries which brought the case before the DSB.
Conservation of natural resources?
Given that its export restriction measures appear inconsistent with its commit-
ments under GATT 1994 and the Accession Protocol, China will have to demon-
strate that its measures satisfy certain exception(s) under Article XX of GATT
1994. As the Appellate Body explicitly clarified during the recent China–
Publications and Audiovisual Products case, there is no doubt that China may
invoke GATT Article XX to excuse itself from its commitments under its
Accession Protocol.23 In fact, responding to the panel request by the complaining
parties, some Chinese officials have already indicated that the objective of these
policies was related to environmental protection.24 In that case, China will have to
demonstrate that its export restriction measures satisfy the requirement of ‘relat-
ing to’ the conservation of natural resources in the meaning of GATT Article XX,
paragraph (g), and that its measures operate ‘ in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption’, i.e. that they are in line with the so-called
‘even-handedness requirement’. In addition, China will have to demonstrate that
these measures do not constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’ as
mentioned in the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX.25
Environmental regulation of mineral production in China
The Environmental Protection Law of China defines the ‘environment’ as ‘ the
total body of all natural elements and artificially transformed natural elements
affecting human existence and development, which includes the atmosphere,
water, seas, land, minerals, forests, grasslands, wildlife, natural and human
remains, nature reserves, historic sites and scenic spots, and urban and rural
23 The Panel, in this case, did look, on an arguendo basis, at whether China’s measures in question
could be justified under GATT Article XX(b). Since it concluded that the measures did not qualify for an
exception satisfying the requirements of GATT Article XX, the Panel decided that it was not necessary for
it to determine whether China has the right to invoke GATT Article XX in cases of inconsistency with its
Accession Protocol. However the Appellate Body decided to clarify this ambiguity and concluded that
China’s right to invoke GATT Article XX also covers its commitments under its Accession Protocol. WTO
(2009b), para. 7.745; WTO (2009c), para. 415(a).
24 The Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s comment on the establishment of the Panel was ‘The goal of
export administrative measures on some raw materials is to protect the environment and our limited
resources.’ ‘The regulations conform to the needs of China’s own (sustainable) development, while also
advancing China’s efforts towards the sustainable development of the global economy.’ See EU Business
(2009).
25 Article XX(g) reads ‘Relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’
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areas’.26 As such, protection of minerals, as part and parcel of the environment,
could be classified as environmental protection under domestic law. This is par-
ticularly relevant in the context of China’s Foreign Trade Law – as it allows for
restrictions and bans on the imports and exports of goods in order to protect,
among other things, the environment (Article 16(2)).27
However China’s domestic environmental regulation specifically addressing
production of minerals is highly fragmented. There are a number of laws dealing
directly or partly with environmental issues related to mining operations.
The Mineral Resources Law requires mining enterprises to have a report on the
‘mining area, its mining design or mining plan, production and technological
conditions and safety and environmental protection measures ’ with an examin-
ation and approval by relevant State authorities (Article 15).28 The Law on Water
and Soil Conservation requires mining enterprises to have a water and soil con-
servation programme which is approved by the Department of Water
Administration (Article 19).29 The Law of the Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution, on the other hand, requires those responsible for underground
mining operations to take protective measures against groundwater pollution
(Article 35).30
Although government authorities may decline to grant permission for pro-
duction on sites or for operations that may lead to environmental damage, these
measures cannot be considered as direct restrictions on production intended to
protect or to prevent the depletion of minerals as environmental resources.
Moreover, it has been argued that the implementation and enforcement of these
regulations have been highly problematic. Complicated institutional and regulat-
ory structures and inconsistencies of implementation have been reported as major
causes of a range of environmental damage, high numbers of casualties among
miners and economic inefficiencies in small-scale mining operations (Cao, 2007;
Andrews-Speed et al., 2003; Wright, 2004).
Resource tax
There is one measure, however, which is directly aimed at production: the
Resource Tax. It is a quantifiable measure which acts as a disincentive to pro-
duction through a ‘market mechanism’. It is directly imposed on production of
non-metal ores, crude oil, natural gas, coal, and solid salt, in the case of non-metal
ores, depending on the type of mineral, its grade (purity), and the location of
production, different tax rates apply. Among the listed minerals under dispute, the
resource tax is Rmb 20.00/ton (US$ 2.9/ton) for bauxite (grade 3); Rmb 2/tonne
(US$ 0.3/ton) for manganese ore; and Rmb 2–4 (US$ 0.3–0.6/ton) for zinc ore
26 See Environmental Protection Law of China Article 2.
27 See Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China Article 16.
28 See Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China.
29 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Water and Soil Conservation.
30 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution.
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(grades 1–5) (State Administration of Taxation, 2010). However, these market
measures are relatively insignificant when compared to the overall value of
production. In March 2010, they amounted to less than 1% of the price of baux-
ite, less than 0.5% of the price of manganese ore, and less than 0.1% of the price
of zink respectively (Asia Metal, 2010; Commodityonline, 2010; Firstbauxite,
2010). Hence the current design and implementation of the Resource Tax does not
seem to offer an effective mechanism to curb production and conserve minerals,
albeit allowing local provinces to raise tax revenues.31
Mineral-specific environmental measures
The Government takes some other mineral-specific measures, directly or indirectly
related to the environment, which affect the mining sector (China Mining
Association, 2010). For example, it imposes limitations on electricity consumption
for mineral production and processing which constrains production and hence
affects prices (USGS, 2008). The government has also introduced a set of standards
regarding the scale and the potential for pollution of production and processing
facilities of some minerals, such as lead, magnesium, manganese, and zinc. In
2008, according to the China Magnesium Association, 18 magnesium plants with
high energy consumption and pollution intensity (as a result of relying on direct
coal combustion) were closed down (China Magnesium Industry, 2007).
However, since the total volume of mineral production by such small-scale
operators is relatively low, such closures were not expected to reduce total
production significantly (TEX Report, 2007).
5. WTO-plus commitments
It is highly likely that China will have difficulty in demonstrating that its export
restrictions in the context of its environmental regulation satisfy the requirements
of Article XX(g). First, although the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the ‘relat-
ing to’ facet of Article XX(g) is less strict than the GATT jurisprudence requiring
the measures in question to be ‘primarily aimed at’ rendering effective the re-
strictions on domestic production and consumption,32 China still has to establish
that its export restrictions are ‘reasonably related’ to the policy goal of conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources. However, as indicated above, its measures
do not appear to be part of its highly fragmented environmental regulation dealing
with mineral production. It would be difficult to establish that the measures in
question are ‘fairly narrowly focused’.
Secondly, whether or not the measures concerned are applied ‘ in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’ (the even-handedness
31 There have been reports that the policy has been under revision and tonnage-based taxation will be
changed to a floating system where the tax rate will be based on the price of the minerals targeted. See
Reuters (2010).
32 See GATT Dispute Settlement Report (1988b).
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requirement), there are difficulties too. They seem to impose restrictions, just in
respect of the exports of the minerals in question, not with respect to domestic
production and consumption. As such they restrict only purchases of these
minerals by foreign processors and consumers and not those made by domestic
processors and consumers. In addition, these restrictions apply only to supplies
in unprocessed form and do not cover exports of processed products which
are composed of the raw materials in question. On the other hand, the above-
mentioned restrictions on domestic production (e.g. the resource tax), or the
product specific environmental measures cover other natural resources which are
not subject to export restrictions. Hence, it is unlikely that the measures concerned
would satisfy the even-handedness requirement. For the next step of the examin-
ation as to whether or not they would satisfy the chapeau of Article XX (i.e. that
they are not ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’), the measures have
to pass the first tier of the analysis (i.e. ‘relating to’ and the ‘even-handedness
requirement’).
In the Canada–Herring and Salmon case, environment-related exceptions under
GATT Article XX were not found to be applicable. Such an outcome is highly
likely for the China–Raw Materials case too. This is mainly because the DSB is
likely to judge that the environmental component/objective of the measures in
question was relatively weak compared to their economic component/objective
with a restrictive impact on trade.
The China–Raw Materials case will be a show case to exemplify the extent
to which China’s WTO-plus commitments might constrain its economic and
environmental policy considerations in the near future. It is clear that WTO law
regarding export restrictions shows signs of disproportionality. Although it is
arguably an area of ‘under-regulation’ or ‘regulatory deficiency’ in WTO law
(see Section 3 above) – as it offers Members ample ‘policy space’ for domestic
policy considerations – it is biased against the late accession Members, the ma-
jority being developing countries such as China, which have had to commit
themselves to stricter rules. Hence unlike other Member countries, China is likely
to face legal action if it resorts to using export restrictions for the objective of
promoting downstream processing and manufacturing sectors. These stricter rules
may also constrain its policy options in addressing various environmental concerns
through export restrictions.33 Although Article XX provides some leeway, this
comes with significant limitations and compliance requirements.
6. Conclusions
Like most of the other GATT/WTO cases on export restrictions, the latest dispute
between China and the US, EU, and Mexico could be seen as another example of
33 Some analysts argue that the accession negotiations were not used to improve sustainable devel-
opment (Charnovitz, 2007).
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competition over natural resources. It involves alleged ‘unfair ’ advantages that the
measures have created for the downstream producers and processors in China,
at the expense of the downstream sectors in complainant countries. For the
complainants, the primary motivation seems to be the objective of obtaining
greater access to raw materials. As the world economy is recovering from the
current slowdown and the international competition over raw materials is picking
up again (reflected in rising prices), China is likely to face growing resistance if it
resorts to using export restrictions. There might be other similar dispute cases filed
against China being brought before the DSB. As such, export restriction is an area
where China might feel the implications of its so called ‘WTO-plus’ commitments
on its domestic and trade policies.
Problems of ‘unfair ’ competition and related global welfare losses would be
substantial if China, which is a major supplier of many commodities with limited
substitution possibilities, continues to resort to export-protectionist measures
(or ‘resource nationalism’). Similarly, in the case of thin market conditions (e.g.
certain strategic minerals), its supply constraints combined with export restrictions
could inflate prices rapidly, to the detriment of net importing countries. This
would also undermine the confidence in the multilateral trading system. It is im-
portant to note that as a major trading country which has been relying heavily on
export-oriented growth, maintaining the stability and the predictability of the
multilateral trading system is in the interest of China’s long-term prosperity.
Hence, China has a strong interest in avoiding policies that would create ad-
ditional volatility in global markets and damage global welfare.
As for its legitimate environmental and social concerns, Chinese policy makers
will need carefully to weigh the effectiveness and the potential benefits of export
restrictions against the welfare losses they cause and consider the alternative tools
at their disposal. There seem to be significant discrepancies between the environ-
mental policy objectives that might be intended to be achieved through export
restrictions and the actual impact on the ground. Depending on the objective
and the nature of environmental externalities, various other policy tools could be
employed and be equally as effective or more so than export restrictions and would
also be potentially less costly in terms of global welfare losses.
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